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I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
HE Texas Supreme Court issued a number of opinions dealing
with subject matter jurisdiction during the Survey period, includ-
ing two important decisions on sovereign immunity. In Tooke v.
City of Mexia, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Local Government
Code provision that a home-rule city may "plead and be impleaded" in
court does not reflect a clear legislative intent to waive immunity from
suit.' Overruling its prior decision in Missouri Pacific Railroad v.
Brownsville Navigation District,2 the supreme court held that statutory
language that a city may "sue and be sued" or "plead and be impleaded"
is not sufficient, by itself, to waive sovereign immunity.3 Rather, the
meaning of these phrases depends on the context in which they are used;
they "can mean that immunity is waived, but they can also mean only that
a governmental entity, like others, has the capacity to sue and be sued in
its own name."'4 The supreme court concluded that the section of the
Local Government Code containing the provision that home-rule cities
may "plead and be impleaded" gives no other indication that the legisla-
ture intended to waive sovereign immunity, and the City was therefore
immune from the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.5
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1. 197 S.W.3d 325, 342 (Tex. 2006) (citing TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN. § 51.075
(Vernon 1999)).
2. 453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970).
3. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 342.
4. Id. at 337. The supreme court noted, for example, that section 76.04 of the Educa-
tion Code provides that the Board of Regents of the University Texas System "may sue
and be sued" in the name of one of its component institutions and that legislative consent
to suits against that institution are granted. Id. at 340 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 76.04 (Vernon 2002)).
5. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 342-43.
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The supreme court also rejected the other arguments advanced in
Tooke for finding a waiver of sovereign immunity.6 First, because the
plaintiffs in Tooke had already received full payment under the contract
for the work they performed, and were only suing for lost profits on addi-
tional work they alleged they should have been given, the supreme court
brushed aside their argument that the doctrine of partial performance
should operate to waive immunity.7 Second, the plaintiffs sought to in-
voke the distinction between a city's governmental and proprietary func-
tions, which is used in determining a municipality's immunity from suit in
tort, to argue there was a waiver of immunity.8 The supreme court noted
that it had never held that the same distinction determines immunity
from suit in contract, but held that it did not need to decide the issue
because the subject matter of the contract in Tooke was in fact a govern-
mental function. 9
Finally, the Tooke plaintiffs argued that the city's own home-rule char-
ter operated to waive immunity, where it provided that the city "may sue
and be sued, may contract and be contracted with, [and] implead and be
impleaded in all courts."'1 The supreme court disagreed, noting that
whether to waive sovereign immunity is a policy question that should be
left to the legislature, and questioned, therefore, whether a city even has
the authority to waive its own immunity by ordinance or charter.'1 Once
again, however, the supreme court did not have to answer this question,
since it concluded this charter language, like the Local Government Code
provision it had previously considered, speaks only to the city's capacity
to act as a corporate body, not its immunity from suit.12
Following Tooke, and decided the same day, Reata Construction Corp.
v. City of Dallas also rejected the arguments that the Local Government
Code or its own charter operated to waive the City of Dallas' immunity
from suit. 13 Reata also held, however, that a city does not have immunity
from claims that are related to, and are properly asserted as an offset
against, claims asserted by the city.14 Although the Texas Supreme Court
noted that it must generally defer to the legislature to determine whether
sovereign immunity should be waived, it "remains the judiciary's respon-
sibility to define the boundaries of that common-law doctrine and to de-
termine under what circumstances sovereign immunity exists in the first
instance."1 5 Discharging this responsibility, the supreme court held that
the policies underlying immunity would not be served, and it would be
fundamentally unfair to litigants, if a governmental entity were allowed to
6. Id. at 343-44.
7. Id. at 343.
8. Id. at 343-44.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 344 (quoting MEXIA, TEX. CFTY CHARTER, art. II, sec. 1).
11. Id.
12. Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 197.
13. 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006).
14. Id. at 373.
15. Id. at 375.
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assert affirmative claims against a party while at the same time claiming it
had immunity as to the party's related claims against it.16 Absent a
broader waiver of immunity by the legislature, however, a trial court
would not acquire jurisdiction over any claim for damages against the city
in excess of damages sufficient to offset the city's own recovery, if any.17
Thomas v. Long involved the Harris County Sheriff's interlocutory ap-
peal from the denial of a jurisdictional plea made as part of his summary
judgment motion.' 8 The court of appeals concluded that, notwithstand-
ing the Texas statute authorizing interlocutory appeals from an order
granting or denying a governmental entity's plea to the jurisdiction,19 it
lacked jurisdiction over the Sheriff's appeal because his objection to juris-
diction was included in a motion for summary judgment.20 The Texas
Supreme Court held that an interlocutory appeal was authorized when-
ever a trial court denies a governmental unit's challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction, irrespective of the procedural vehicle used.2' Turning then to
the merits of the jurisdictional argument, the supreme court held that the
Harris County Civil Service Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over
the employment dispute at issue and that the plaintiff had failed to ex-
haust her administrative remedies, thereby depriving the district court of
jurisdiction over her claim for reinstatement. 22
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court held in Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Texas v. Duenez that the Employee Retirement System of Texas (ERS)
had exclusive jurisdiction over the insurance coverage dispute in that case
and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction based on the plain-
tiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. 23 In doing so, the
supreme court noted that a party cannot circumvent the legislature's in-
tent to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the ERS by filing a declaratory judg-
ment action.24 The supreme court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that their failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused
because they were threatened with "irreparable harm. ' 25 Even if such an
exception existed-a question 'that the supreme court did not reach-the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ERS could not have provided
16. Id. at 377.
17. Id.
18. 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2006).
19. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 54.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
20. Thomas, 207 S.W.3d at 339-40.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 342. The supreme court also reiterated the rule that, if the trial court has
jurisdiction over at least one claim, the proper course is for a trial court to dismiss the
claims it lacks jurisdiction over and retain those over which it has jurisdiction, once again
disapproving of those cases that had held otherwise. Id. at 338-39.
23. 201 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. 2006).
24. Id. The supreme court explained that, despite the plaintiffs' contention that their
suit did not implicate the "payment of a claim," they sought a declaration that the medical
services were covered by the plan and an injunction compelling the insurer to pay for the
care. Id.
25. Id. at 666-67 (citing Houston Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch.




Finally, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the standing and mootness
components of subject matter jurisdiction in Allstate Indemnity Co. v.
Forth27 and Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio,28 respectively.
In Forth, a breach of contract suit, the supreme court held that the in-
sured plaintiff lacked standing to complain of the manner in which the
defendant insurer settled her medical bills, where the insured did not
claim that she had any unreimbursed expenses or that any of her medical
providers withheld any service or threatened to sue her for any defi-
ciency.29 In Marshall, the supreme court held that the forcible detainer
action became moot where the tenant relinquished possession of the
premises and her lease expired.30 The supreme court rejected the ten-
ant's arguments that there was still a live controversy because she would
still be liable for court costs and would suffer "collateral consequences"
in the form of future lost rent subsidies due to her eviction, since the
underlying judgment would be vacated based on the finding that the case
was moot.31
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The Texas Supreme Court set aside a ten-million-dollar default judg-
ment because the defendant was never served in Ross v. National Center
for the Employment of the Disabled.32 In this bill of review, the supreme
court rejected the argument that the defendant was at fault because he
received a postcard notice of the default judgment against him and did
not file an out-of-time motion for new trial.33 Ross re-emphasizes that
proper service is not a mere technicality, and "'[a] party who becomes
aware of the proceedings without proper service of process has no duty to
participate in them." 34 The defendant filed his bill of review within the
applicable limitations period, and he had no further duty to act diligently
in pursuing a motion for new trial in a case in which he was never
served.35
In several cases involving restricted appeals during the Survey period,
the intermediate appellate courts continued to strictly enforce the re-
quirements for valid service. Thus, in Mansell v. Insurance Co. of the
26. Id. at 677.
27. 204 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2006).
28. 198 S.W.3d 782, 782 (Tex. 2006).
29. Forth, 204 S.W.3d at 796.
30. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787.
31. Id. at 788-90.
32. 197 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2006).
33. Id. at 797 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 306(a).
34. Ross, 197 S.W.3d at 797 (quoting Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 97 n.1 (Tex.
2004)). But see City of Tyler v. Beck, 196 S.W.3d 784, 786-87 (Tex. 2006) (formal service of
process on landowners was not required in condemnation proceeding where landowners
had already filed objection to the special commissioners' award).
35. Ross, 197 S.W.3d at 798. The supreme court also rejected the argument that the
default could be upheld as a discovery sanction or based on the defendant's failure to
appear at the trial of his bill of review after receiving a subpoena. Id.
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West, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a citation was
fatally defective where it misstated the date of filing of the plaintiff's peti-
tion.36 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it should apply a
"more practical, lenient approach" to the rule, instead requiring strict
compliance with the statutory requirements for valid service. 37 The Tyler
Court of Appeals likewise refused to loosen the strict-compliance stan-
dard in In re Z.J.W., holding that the process server's failure to endorse
the citation with the date and hour he received it was a fatal defect.38
And the Dallas Court of Appeals held, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Carroll-
ton-Farmers Branch Independent School District, that a default judgment
had to be set aside where the return of service did not reflect that the
individual served was authorized to act on behalf of the defendant's cor-
porate registered agent. 39
III. VENUE
In In re Applied Chemical Magnesias Corp.,n° the Texas Supreme Court
held that a declaratory judgment suit seeking to determine the contrac-
tual rights of parties to surface and mineral leases was an "action involv-
ing an interest in real property thus making it subject to the mandatory
venue provision of Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code. ' 41 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court rejected the ar-
gument that Smith v. Hall42 stands for the broad proposition that a suit
for construction or enforcement of an executory contract for the sale of
land is not a suit for the recovery of land or to quiet title within the mean-
ing of Section 15.011. 43 First, the supreme court noted that the Smith
decision was based on the predecessor statute, which provided a more
complex scheme for venue in real property cases and was less inclusive
with regard to mandatory venue than the current statute.44 Second, the
supreme court found that, even under the prior statute, venue was deter-
mined by the essence of the relief sought and not by the cause of action
that was pled. 45 In this instance, the supreme court determined that the
appellant was using the declaratory judgment mechanism as an indirect
means of quieting title to the mineral estate in real property. 46 Thus, the
essence of the dispute was whether the appellant had a right to mine on
the appellee's land, which involved an interest in real property subject to
the mandatory venue provision.47
36. 203 S.W.3d 499, 501-02 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
37. Id. at 501.
38. 185 S.W.3d 905, 907-08 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.).
39. 180 S.W.3d 903, 905-06 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
40. 206 S.W.3d 114, 115 (Tex. 2006).
41. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 2002).
42. 147 Tex. 634, 219 S.W.2d 441 (1949).
43. Applied Chem., 206 S.W.3d at 117.
44. Id. at 118.
45. Id. at 118-19.
46. Id. at 119.
47. Id. at 119.
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In Toliver v. Dallas/Fort Worth Hospital Council, the Dallas Court of
Appeals considered whether a party had waived its motion to transfer
venue by first filing several pleadings in federal court. Toliver sued the
Council in state court and, in response, the Council removed the case to
the Fort Worth Division of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. Several days later, the Council filed a motion
to transfer venue to the Dallas Division, together with its answer in fed-
eral court. The federal court denied the motion to transfer venue and,
thereafter, granted Toliver's motion to remand the case to state court.
Fourteen days after the remand order was filed with the Tarrant County
district clerk, the Council filed a "renewed motion to transfer venue" to
Dallas County. The trial court granted the motion and transferred the
case to Dallas County, where the Council prevailed on summary judg-
ment. On appeal, Toliver argued that the Council had waived its state
court motion to transfer venue because it was filed after the Council had
removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to transfer and an-
swer in that court. 48 The court of appeals rejected Toliver's argument,
holding that a party does not waive its motion to transfer venue by filing
a notice of removal, motion to transfer venue, and answer in federal
court. 49 Rather, because the state court motion to transfer venue was the
Council's first pleading filed in state court, it comported with the due
order of pleadings requirement, 50 and no waiver had occurred. 51
IV. PARTIES
In Ray Malooly Trust v. Juhl,52 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
trust could not be sued without including the trustee as a party. But the
supreme court ultimately found that the trust had waived the point at
trial. On appeal, Juhl primarily argued that the Code Construction Act
permitted suing a trust without including the trustee.53 The supreme
court rejected the argument that the Code Construction Act permitted a
trust to be sued as a separate entity because it specifies that a "person"
includes a "trust. '54 First, the supreme court held that the Code Con-
struction Act only addresses the construction of codes and not the capac-
48. 198 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
49. Id. at 447-48.
50. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1):
1. Time to File. An objection to improper venue is waived if not made by
written motion filed prior to or concurrently with any other plea, pleading or
motion except a special appearance motion provided for in Rule 120a. A
written consent of the parties to transfer the case to another county may be
filed with the clerk of the court at any time. A motion to transfer venue
because an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is
pending is governed by the provisions of Rule 257.
51. Toliver, 198 S.W.3d at 447-48.
52. 186 S.W.3d 568, 570-71 (Tex. 2006).
53. Id. at 571.
54. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.005(2) (Vernon 2005).
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ity to be sued.55 Second, the supreme court explained that the definitions
in the Code Construction Act only apply if other statutes do not require a
different definition. 56 In this case, the Texas Trust Code defines a "trust"
as a relationship rather than a legal entity and provides that only trustees
"may compromise, contest, arbitrate, or settle claims" against a trust. 57
The supreme court also rejected the argument that the Texas Trust
Code allowed trusts to be sued without including the trustee as a party
because it permits, but does not require, a plaintiff to sue the trustee in
his representative capacity.5 8 The supreme court held that the use of the
word "may" only meant that claimants had permission to sue the trustee,
but did not authorize suits solely against the trust.59 Despite all of the
foregoing, the supreme court entered judgment against the trust because
it found that the trust had waived its capacity argument by not filing a
verified answer until the day of trial. 60
In In re Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co.,61 the Texas Supreme Court
had the rare opportunity to consider when a party can intervene pursuant
to the "virtual-representation" doctrine. Initially, the supreme court reit-
erated that "[g]enerally only parties of record may appeal a trial court's
judgment. ' 62 In some rare circumstances, however, a person or entity,
who was not named as a party in the trial court, "may pursue an appeal in
order to vindicate important rights." 63 The supreme court further ex-
plained that under the virtual-representation doctrine,
an unnamed litigant is deemed to be a party if it will be bound by the
judgment, its privity of interest appears from the record, and there is
an identity of interest between the litigant and the named party to
the judgment. 64 Because one who is virtually represented is already
deemed to be a party, theoretically it "is not required to intervene in
order to appeal. ' 65 However, as a practical matter, one who seeks to
invoke the virtual-representation doctrine to assert an interest on ap-
peal must take some timely, appropriate action to attain name-party
status.
66
In this case, the insurer had posted a twenty-nine million-dollar bond
to supersede an adverse judgment against its insured and later sought to
55. By way of example, the supreme court noted that the Code Construction Act in-
cludes "estates" as statutory "persons," but an estate is not a legal entity and may not
properly sue or be sued. Juhl, 186 S.W.3d at 570.
56. Id. at 570.
57. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.004(4), 113.019 (Vernon 2003).
58. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.084(a) (Vernon 2003) ("the plaintiff may sue the
trustee in his representative capacity, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff is
collectable by execution against the trust property").
59. Juhl, 186 S.W.3d at 570-711.
60. Id. at 571.
61. 184 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006).
62. Id. at 723.
63. Id.





intervene in the insured's appeal after the appellate briefing had been
completed. The insurer sought to intervene to assert a potentially dispos-
itive argument that its insured had abandoned in order to settle certain
uninsured claims in another pending lawsuit. The court of appeals denied
the motion to intervene, and the insurer petitioned the supreme court for
mandamus relief.67 As a threshold matter, the supreme court determined
that the insurer had met the requirements necessary to assert the virtual-
representation doctrine.68
First, the supreme court rejected the argument that the "identity of in-
terest" requirement was not met because the insured had waived an argu-
ment that its insurer wanted to bring forward on appeal.69 Rather, the
supreme court found that a party seeking to invoke the virtual-represen-
tation doctrine to appeal will often, if not always, have concluded that its
interests have diverged to some extent from the party that formerly rep-
resented its interests. 70 Here, the supreme court held that the insurer and
insured's interests had not materially diverged because they both still had
the same ultimate aim of reversing the underlying judgment. 71
The supreme court also rejected the argument that the virtual-repre-
sentation doctrine should not apply because the insurer could attempt to
recover on its supersedeas bond from the insured under the noncoopera-
tion provision of its insurance policy. 72 Rather, the supreme court found
that the insurer's immediate and binding obligation to pay the underlying
judgment was sufficient to invoke the doctrine.7 3
The supreme court then considered the court of appeals' determination
that the application of the virtual-representation doctrine would be ineq-
uitable because: (1) the insurer did not attempt to invoke the doctrine
until the trial court's judgment became final; (2) the insurer did not at-
tempt to invoke the doctrine until all the briefing in the court of appeals
had been completed; and (3) if the insurer was permitted to appeal in this
case, then all insurers would be entitled to intervene on appeal, poten-
tially conflicting with the insured's appellate strategy or raising issues
contrary to their insured's interests.74
First, the supreme court held that the virtual-representation doctrine
could be used for post-judgment interventions. 75 Specifically, as long as
the need to invoke those rights occurred after the judgment, the failure to
raise them before judgment was not dispositive.76 Similarly, the supreme
court also found that attempting to intervene after the appellate briefing
was completed was not fatal to the insurer's attempt to invoke the doc-
67. Id. at 720.
68. Id. at 729.
69. Id. at 724.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 724-25.
72. Id. at 725.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 723.
75. Id. at 726.
76. Id.
[Vol. 60
Pre- Trial and Trial
trine.77 The supreme court first noted that it had never set forth any stan-
dard for the timeliness of attempting to invoke the doctrine and
accordingly, adopted the following factors that had been recently set
forth by the Fifth Circuit:
(1) the length of time during which the would-be intervenor should
have known of its interest in the case before attempting to intervene;
(2) the extent of prejudice that the existing parties may suffer as a
result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply for intervention
as soon as it actually knew or should have known of its interest in the
case; (3) the extent of prejudice the would-be intervenor would suf-
fer if intervention is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circum-
stances militating either for or against a determination that the
application is timely.78 After a lengthy consideration of these fac-
tors, the supreme court concluded that, under the facts of the present
case, the insurer's intervention was timely. 79
Finally, the supreme court rejected the public policy arguments regard-
ing the potential conflicts between the insurer and insured, noting that
the same concerns would exist if the insurer had intervened at the trial
court level, which the parties, agreed would have been permitted. 80
Nonetheless, the supreme court was careful to note that the application
of the virtual-representation doctrine should be decided on a case-by-case
basis.81
V. PLEADINGS
During the Survey period, several cases addressed a party's right to
amend its pleadings under Rule 63.82 In Dunnagan v. Watson, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals considered whether Watson's second amended
petition, which was filed seven days before the trial setting and added a
new cause of action for judicial dissolution of a limited partnership, oper-
ated to surprise and prejudice the opposing party. At the time of the
proposed amendment, Watson and Dunnagan had asserted claims against
each other for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court allowed Watson's
amendment, and Dunnagan appealed.83
The court of appeals considered the following factors in determining
whether the proposed amendment constituted surprise:
(1) how long the suit had been on file before the amendment was
filed; (2) how soon before trial the amendment was made; (3)
whether the amendment presented a substantially new claim or
77. Id. at 727.
78. Id. at 726 (citing Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2005)).
79. Lumberman's, 184 S.W.3d at 726-28.
80. Id. at 728-29.
81. Id. at 728-29.
82. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63 provides that "a party may amend its pleadings at any time
unless the amendment will operate as a surprise; however, any pleadings offered for filing
within seven days of trial shall be filed only after leave of court is obtained."
83. 204 S.W.3d 30, 34 & 37 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
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cause of action; (4) whether the new cause of action was based on
recently discovered matters; and (5) whether the resisting party al-
leged surprise and that he was not prepared to try the new claim.
84
In this instance, the court held that the third and fifth factors were dispos-
itive, and the trial court had correctly allowed the amendment.
8 5
First, the court found that when analyzing whether the amendment
presented a substantially new claim or cause of action, the test was not
whether any new claim was added but rather whether the new cause of
action constituted a "wholesale revision" of the suit.86 Under these cir-
cumstances, since no additional damages were sought by the amendment
and the fiduciary duty claims had previously been pled, the court found
that the amended pleading did not constitute a "wholesale revision" of
the suit.87 Second, the court held that, although Dunnagan had alleged
surprise, he had not claimed that he was not prepared to try the new
cause of action. 88 The court found that failure to make this allegation
was fatal to his appeal.
89
In Zeecon Wireless Internet, LLC v. McEwen,90 the Austin Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had improperly granted a motion to
strike an amended answer, which was filed seven days before trial, and
asserted, for the first time, a statute-of-frauds defense. The court held
that the amended answer did not constitute surprise or prejudice because,
although the party had not previously asserted that defense in its answer,
it had disclosed the defense in its responses to request for disclosures
approximately five months before the trial.91
In Roskey v. Continental Casualty Co., Roskey alleged she had suffered
an occupational injury. In response, the defendants filed a plea to the
jurisdiction on May 15, 2003, alleging that primary jurisdiction over the
disputed medical benefits was vested in the Texas Worker's Compensa-
tion Commission and that Roskey had failed to exhaust her administra-
tive remedies. The defendants did not, however, initially set the plea for
hearing. On June 22, 2004, the trial court entered an agreed scheduling
order, which provided that amended pleadings were to be filed no later
than October 7, 2004. The plea to the jurisdiction was finally argued on
October 13, 2004, at which point Roskey, for the first time, made an oral
request to amend her pleadings to demonstrate jurisdiction. 9 2 The trial
court denied Roskey's motion to amend, and the Dallas Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that, although a party should generally be permitted to
amend to address jurisdictional issues, Roskey had failed to take advan-
84. Id. at 38 (citing Stevenson v. Koutzarov, 795 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
85. Dunnagan, 204 S.W.3d at 38-39.




90. 212 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, no pet.).
91. Id. at 767.
92. 190 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
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tage of the opportunity by waiting approximately seventeen months after
the plea was filed to request leave to amend. 93
VI. DISCOVERY
In re Graco Children's Products, Inc. was a vehicle rollover case involv-
ing an infant car seat manufactured by Graco. Two weeks before trial,
the "Consumer Products Safety Commission announced a provisional
settlement with Graco imposing a $4 million civil penalty" for failure to
report defects in more than a dozen products-including high chairs, sw-
ings, and strollers-which did not include car seats. Plaintiffs' attorneys
immediately requested a deposition and documents regarding the subject
of this settlement, and Graco objected on relevance and burdensomeness
grounds. The trial court allowed the requested discovery, and the court
of appeals denied mandamus relief.9 4 The Texas Supreme Court held,
however, that there was no connection between the alleged defect in the
car seat and the discovery sought. 95 The supreme court rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments that the discovery was needed to show that Graco
did not test any of its products for rollovers (which Graco conceded as to
the car seat) and to refute Graco's defense that it works in partnership
with the government agencies, during which time it had never heard of
children slipping from a five-point car seat harness in a rollover.96 Al-
though the supreme court acknowledged that a corporate defendant's
state of mind about a particular product may be discoverable, the court
refused to allow that inquiry to extend to every product the defendant
ever manufactured.97
Depositions were the subject of an unusual number of appellate deci-
sions during the Survey period. In In re Toyota Motor Corp., a personal
injury case arising out of a head-on collision, Toyota sought to depose two
minor children who were in the vehicle, one of whom was a plaintiff and
the other a former plaintiff in the case. Toyota sought testimony regard-
ing the position of the children in the car, including a third child who was
severely injured, and whether they were wearing safety belts. The plain-
tiffs objected, relying on a psychiatrist who examined the children and
testified that, although they both had memories of the collision, they suf-
fered from post-traumatic stress disorder and would be traumatized if
they were required to give an oral deposition regarding the collision. The
trial court ordered that the depositions be taken only by written ques-
tions, without Toyota's attorney present, and the Waco Court of Appeals
denied Toyota's writ of mandamus. 98 The court of appeals dismissed
Toyota's argument that this procedure was "indistinguishable from writ-
93. Id. at 881.
94. 210 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2006).
95. Id. at 601.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 191 S.W.3d 498, 500-01 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ten interrogatories," noting that attorneys may not answer written depo-
sition questions for clients, and that a court reporter, not plaintiffs'
counsel, would record the children's answers to Toyota's questions. 99
Oral depositions were also precluded by the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals in In re Exxon Corp.100 and In re Burroughs."o" In Exxon, the court
of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
the deposition of a corporate representative to testify regarding the ef-
forts undertaken to search for documents sought in requests for produc-
tion that Exxon had previously responded to. 102 Surveying the
procedural history of the case, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs
had not produced any evidence of discovery abuse that would justify an
investigation into Exxon's compliance with its production obligations but
were instead engaged in a fishing expedition into matters that were either
privileged or irrelevant. 10 3 In Burroughs, the court of appeals extended
its previous holding that compelling a deposition of an opposing party's
attorney of record is generally inappropriate, holding that the deposition
of a non-party witness's attorney should not be allowed either. 104
The availability of pre-suit depositions under Rule 202105 was the sub-
ject of several cases decided during the Survey period. In re Allan'0 6 and
In re Raja107 reached different conclusions on whether a Rule 202 deposi-
tion is allowed to investigate a medical-liability claim governed by Chap-
ter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,108 with the Tyler Court of
Appeals allowing the deposition in Allan, 0 9 and the Eastland Court of
Appeals refusing to do so in Raja." 0 In In re Hewlett-Packard,"' the
Austin Court of Appeals held that Dell could not take Rule 202 deposi-
tions of its former employees, now employed at Hewlett-Packard, in or-
der to investigate a potential claim that the employees misappropriated
Dell's trade secrets, where the depositions themselves would likely reveal
Hewlett-Packard's trade secrets and confidential information. 12
Since the new discovery rules were adopted in 1999, several courts of
appeals have held that Rule 192.3(e)( 5),113 which specifically allows for
discovery of the bias of an expert witness, does not make an expert's fi-
99. Id. at 502-03.
100. 208 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. granted]).
101. 203 S.W.3d 858, 858-59 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding [mand.
granted]).
102. Exxon, 208 S.W. 3d at 76-77.
103. Id. at 76-77.
104. Burroughs, 203 S.W.3d at 860.
105. TEX. R. Civ. P. 202.1.
106. 191 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
107. 216 S.W.3d 404, 409 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, orig. proceeding [mand.
granted]).
108. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001 (Vernon 2005).
109.- Allan, 191 S.W.3d at 488-89.
110. Raja, 216 S.W.3d at 409..
111. 212 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
112. Id. at 361-62.
113. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)( 5) (Vernon 2006).
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nancial records discoverable for the sole purpose of showing bias. 11 4 In
In re Plains Marketing, L.P., the Beaumont Court of Appeals followed a
similar line of reasoning in holding that it was error for the trial court to
compel an expert witness to produce all of the reports he had prepared as
a medical expert for the last ten years."1 5 The court noted that the expert
had already testified that he derived significant income from medical con-
sulting work for litigation defense firms, and that he had worked for rela-
tor's counsel's firm on fourteen prior occasions.' 16 Because there was no
suggestion as to what other information regarding bias would be revealed
by the expert's prior expert reports and there were legitimate concerns
about the confidentiality of third parties' medical information, the court
held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the reports
produced.' 1 7
In re BP Products North America Inc. arose out of the 2005 explosion
at BP's refinery in Texas City. Several days after the incident, BP re-
ported that it had established a $700 million reserve to resolve its esti-
mated liabilities for the resulting personal injuries and fatalities. The
plaintiffs in this case sought discovery of the documents used by BP's in-
house counsel to compute this reserve figure. 118 Based on the attorney's
affidavit, however, the First District Court of Appeals concluded that the
requested information was protected by the attorney-client and work-
product privileges. 11 9 The court also held, in what it believed to be an
issue of first impression in Texas, that BP had not waived any privileges
with respect to the supporting documentation by virtue of having re-
ported the reserve figure itself to the SEC and to the media.120
Texas courts also addressed the procedure for claiming privilege during
the Survey period. In In re Crestcare Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, a
nursing home objected to producing any personnel files of its employees
on "privacy" grounds.' 2' The Tyler Court of Appeals concluded that,
while some information in personnel files might come within a protected
zone of privacy, the party asserting such a privacy right must present par-
ticularized evidence regarding what information should be shielded and
why. 122 Because the nursing home failed to meet this evidentiary stan-
dard, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in ordering
the files produced without conducting an in-camera inspection. 123 In In
re Strategic Impact Corp., on the other hand, the Fourteenth District
114. See, e.g., In re Makris, 217 S.W.3d'521,523-24 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, orig.
proceeding [mand. granted]).
115. 195 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding [mand.
granted]).
116. Id. at 781.
117. Id. at 782-84.
118. No. 01-06-00679-CV, 2006 WL 2973037, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct.
13, 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. granted]).
119. Id. at *6.
120. Id. at *8-9.
121. 222 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
122. Id. at 74.
123. Id. at 74-75.
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Court of Appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge
to refuse to review allegedly privileged documents in camera based on
the fact that the documents, which had come into the relators' possession
anonymously, had been stolen by an unknown party.
124
Once again, the sanction of exclusion of witnesses or evidence based on
a failure to supplement discovery was an oft-litigated subject during the
Survey period. In Harris County v. Inter Nos, Ltd., the First District
Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's exclusion of any evidence re-
garding a damage theory in a condemnation case, where the County had
failed to supplement its response to the landowner's request for disclo-
sure.1 25 Moreover, the court of appeals also rejected the County's argu-
ment that it was nevertheless entitled to cross-examine the landowner's
expert with respect to the damage theory that it was precluded from of-
fering through its own witnesses' direct testimony.126 Conversely, where
the plaintiff cross-designated her opponents' expert witness in discovery,
albeit arguably untimely, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held
in Hooper v. Chittaluru that the trial court erred in preventing the plain-
tiff from calling the opponents' expert to testify at trial. 1
2 7
Lopez v. La Madeleine of Texas, Inc. was a personal injury case in
which, as the Dallas Court of Appeals described it, the trial court was
"presented . . . with a dilemma.' 28 The defendant used a surveillance
videotape and photos at trial to show that the plaintiff had apparently
testified falsely about the extent of his injuries. However, defendant's
counsel had intentionally failed to disclose the existence of the videotape
and photos during discovery in response to a specific request for the
same.' 2 9 Thus, the case presented the question of whether a party may
"impeach a witness and refute possibly perjured testimony by introducing
evidence that was withheld from disclosure in violation of the rules re-
garding discovery. ' 130 The court of appeals answered this question in the
negative, reasoning that the rules do not allow a party to "impugn the
sanctity of the judicial process by violating the rules of discovery" in or-
der to defend the sanctity of that same process from the opposing party's
allegedly false testimony. 3 1
Finally, two cases during the Survey period addressed whether an ex-
pert witness's modification or refinement of his opinion must be excluded
where a party fails to timely supplement its discovery responses. In Vela
v. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. 13 2 the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision to allow a defense expert's testimony on valua-
124. 214 S.W.3d 484, 488-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding
[mand. granted as to first cause; mand. denied as to second cause]).
125. 199 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
126. Id. at 368-69.
127. 222 S.W.3d 103, 108-11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
128. 200 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 861.
132. 203 S.W.3d 37, 52, 53-54 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
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tion, over plaintiffs' objection that the expert was testifying to a new dam-
ages model or new critique of plaintiffs' expert's damages model. The
court of appeals noted that the defendant's expert did not materially
change his opinion but, instead, merely expanded on the plaintiff's ex-
pert's model by performing a mathematical calculation using factors that
were already in evidence. 133 In State v. Target Corp.,134 the Waco Court
of Appeals held that the trial court erred in excluding the State's expert
testimony on damages. Even assuming the State's supplementation of its
discovery responses, in which it provided one page of the expert's calcula-
tions and the identity of consultants on whom he relied, was untimely, the
court of appeals noted that the expert had been timely designated and
deposed and, therefore, Target was not unfairly surprised or prejudiced
by the late supplementation. 135
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Texas courts, including the Texas Supreme Court, continued to struggle
with the question of admissible expert testimony in the context of "no-
evidence" motions for summary judgment during the Survey period. In
LMB, Ltd. v. Moreno136 and Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez,137 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate courts' and affirmed the trial
courts' decisions granting no-evidence summary judgments. In both
cases, the supreme court disregarded the plaintiffs' expert's affidavits and
reports because they failed to meet the required degree of reliability
under Robinson.138 Thus, the supreme court held there was no evidence
proving liability. 139
In Rich v. Mulupuri,140 the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a no-
evidence summary judgment in a medical malpractice suit where the
plaintiff had failed to timely designate its medical experts. The trial court
had issued a scheduling order that required the designation of the plain-
tiff's experts by a certain date. Although the plaintiff had previously dis-
closed two non-treating experts in response to requests for disclosure, the
plaintiff had not provided any of the other requested expert information.
Two weeks after the expert-designation deadline, the defendants filed
their no-evidence summary judgment motion based, in large part, upon
the plaintiff's failure to timely designate any expert witnesses under the
trial court's scheduling order. The plaintiff's summary judgment response
then included an expert report, which the defendants moved to strike as
133. Id. at 53-54.
134. 194 S.W.3d 46, 48 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.).
135. Id. at 48, 50.
136. 201 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. 2006).
137. 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006).
138. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
139. LMB, 201 S.W.3d at 689; Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 584; see also Gonzales v. Shing Wai
Brass & Metal Wares Factory, Ltd., 190 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no
pet.).
140. 205 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. filed).
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untimely under the trial court's scheduling order. In affirming the trial
court's decision to strike the expert report and grant the summary judg-
ment motion, the court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's responses to
the summary judgment motion and motion to strike failed to address
whether the discovery rules could be used to preclude the use of late-
designated expert testimony as summary judgment evidence. Because
the plaintiff failed to preserve this point on appeal, the court held that it
was waived.14 1
The preservation of error regarding evidentiary objections in the sum-
mary judgment context continued to plague the appellate courts during
the Survey period. In Hogan v. J. Higgins Trucking, Inc.,142 the Dallas
Court of Appeals noted a split of authority among the courts of appeals
regarding whether a ruling on evidentiary objections must be reduced to
writing or can be implied from the record. In Hogan, although the de-
fendants objected to an affidavit submitted in a response to their sum-
mary judgment motion as a "sham affidavit" that directly contradicted
the affiant's prior deposition testimony, the record did not show that the
trial court expressly sustained the defendants' objection. The court of
appeals refused to imply from the record that the trial court had sus-
tained the defendants' objection and held that "the better practice is for
the trial court to disclose, in writing, its ruling on all evidence before it
enters the order granting or denying summary judgment.' 1 43 The court
went on to note that, because the defendants' objection was one of
"form" (as opposed to "substance"), it could not be raised for the first
time on appeal.' 44
In Delfino v. Perry Homes,145 involving defects in the sale a of residen-
tial home, the First District Court of Appeals likewise criticized the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals' holdings in Blum v. Julian146 and Frazier v.
Yu147 that a ruling on objections to summary judgment evidence may be
implied from the record and also concluded that the better practice is to
obtain express rulings on those objections. 148 Nonetheless, in this case,
because the plaintiffs failed to prove there was any fact question regard-
ing the damages they claimed to have suffered, the court of appeals af-
firmed the summary judgment. 149
Taking the opposite view, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in
Residential Dynamics, LLC v. Loveless150 that rulings on evidentiary ob-
jections in summary judgment practice are properly preserved if they are
141. Id. at 4.
142. 197 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
143. Id. at 883 (quoting Breadnax v. Kroger Texas, L.P., No. 05-04-01306-CV, 2005 WL
2031782 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (mem. op))..
144. Id.
145. 223 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
146. 977 S.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
147. 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
148. "Delfino, 223 S.W.3d at 34-35.
149. Id.
150. 186 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
[Vol. 60
Pre- Trial and Trial
either express or implied from the record. Based upon the record before
it, the court of appeals held that the trial court's judgment implicitly over-
ruled the objections to the respondent's affidavit when it granted the mo-
vant's no-evidence summary judgment motion.151 The court went on to
reject an argument that the affidavit's jurat was defective where the affi-
davit contained an acknowledgement and recited that the affiant, "duly
sworn upon his oath, deposed and stated the information that
followed." 152
In Heil Co. v. Polar Corp.,t 53 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals af-
firmed a summary judgment in part and reversed and remanded in part
where one of the parties did not expressly move for summary judgment,
but the trial court's summary judgment order included that party as well.
Noting that a trial court may not render summary judgment in favor of a
party who has not moved for its entry, the court of appeals reversed the
summary judgment as to that defendant.1 54
In Bean v. Reynolds Realty Group,1 55 the Texarkana Court of Appeals
reversed a summary judgment where the defendant's motion failed to
properly articulate any grounds for summary judgment. Rather, the de-
fendant filed a proforma motion simply alleging that "there is no evi-
dence to support the plaintiff's causes of action and allegations." The
court of appeals held that such a statement was an insufficiently specific
ground for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment as a matter of
law. 156
Finally, in Reyes v. Credit Based Asset Servicing & Securitization,157 the
San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment order
where the movant amended its pleading after it filed its summary judg-
ment motion. Although the non-movant timely objected to the movant's
pleading amendment, which was filed fewer than twenty-one but more
than seven days before the summary judgment hearing, the non-movant
failed to show any type of unfair surprise as required under Rule 63.158
The court of appeals therefore held that it was not fundamentally unfair
for the movant to amend its original petition before the summary judg-
ment hearing.' 59
VIII. DISMISSAL
The Texas Supreme Court in Guest v. Dixon160 held that Rule
165a(3)'s 161 requirement that a motion to reinstate be verified was satis-
151. Id. at 195.
152. Id. at 197.
153. 191 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
154. Id. at 818-19.
155. 192 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
156. Id. at 859-60.
157. 190 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
158. TEx. R. Civ. P. 63.
159. Reyes, 190 S.W.3d at 739.
160. 195 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. 2006).
161. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(3).
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fied when the motion was supported by the affidavit of an attorney who
worked on the case, even in the absence of a proper verification attached
to the motion itself. 162 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed and re-
manded the case for further review in light of its holding.1 63
In University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Estate of
Blackman,164 the Texas Supreme Court held that a nonsuit under Rule
162165 was still effective when it was filed during the pendency of the
petitioner's interlocutory appeal, because the filing of the nonsuit extin-
guished any case or controversy and thus deprived the appellate court of
jurisdiction over the appeal.1 66 Similarly, in Regent Care Center v. Har-
grave,1 67 the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an
action based on a nonsuit taken during an interlocutory appeal, because
at the time the nonsuit was filed, the appellant did not have any pending
claim for relief that might have otherwise precluded the entry of the
nonsuit. 16 s
In Bazan v. Canales,16 9 the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals
held that the trial court erred in dismissing a case for want of prosecution
when it had previously entered a default judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff, even though that default judgment had never been reduced to writ-
ing.' 70 Although normally four steps must occur for the entry of a final
judgment ((1) the announcement of the judgment, either orally in open
court or by some memorandum filed with the clerk; (2) the notation on
the docket; (3) the signing of the judgment; and (4) the entry of the judg-
ment in the court's minutes), the trial court's oral rendition of a default
judgment was nonetheless deemed to be final because it disposed of all
parties and issues. At that point, even though the default judgment had
only been rendered orally, the appellate court held, "there is nothing left
to be done except the memorialization of the judgment. '1 71
The Waco Court of Appeals in Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. H & S
Supply Co.172 determined when a judgment entered by prior appellate
court based upon a dismissal "becomes final" for limitation purposes
under section 16.064 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.173
162. Guest, 195 S.W.3d at 689. See also Andrews v. Stanton, 198 S.W.3d 4, 7-9 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
163. See Guest v. Dixon, 223 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Sept. 5, 2006, no pet.)
(affirming the dismissal for want of prosecution on remand because the case had been on
file more than fifteen months and had not been diligently pursued during that time).
164. 195 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2006).
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162.
166. Blackmon, 195 S.W.3d at 100. The supreme court noted, however, that the trial
court could still address the opposing party's request for costs before signing an order of
dismissal. Id. at 100-01.
167. 202 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. filed).
168. Id. at 810.
169. 200 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
170. Id. at 848.
171. Id.
172. 195 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
173. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064 (Vernon 1997).
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In this construction dispute, the jury found in favor of both parties on
their respective claims against the other, and the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of the appellant for the net difference between the
amounts awarded by the jury. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals (which
heard the first appeal) reversed the judgment in favor of the appellant,
since the amount awarded on its counterclaims exceeded the jurisdic-
tional limits of the county court in which the action had been filed, and
rendered a judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Within sixty-
eight days of that opinion, the appellant filed a second action in district
court. The appellee then successfully moved for summary judgment
based on limitations. For purposes of calculating limitations under sec-
tion 16.064, the Waco Court of Appeals concluded that the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals' judgment of dismissal became final when it disposed of
all issues and all parties in the case, and that court's power to alter the
judgment, had ended. That occurred when the Fort Worth court's ple-
nary power over the judgment of dismissal expired under Rule 19.1(a).174
Accordingly, the Waco Court of Appeals held that the appellant's newly
filed claims were not barred by limitations, as they were filed only eight
days after the prior appellate judgment of dismissal became final. 175
Finally, in WMC Mortgage Corp. v. Starkey,176 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals held that the trial court properly dismissed the appellant's claims
for want of prosecution under its inherent authority. The appellant origi-
nally sued in Tarrant County. Following an exchange of three Rule 11177
letter agreements between the parties that extended the defendant's an-
swer deadline, the suit was eventually transferred from Tarrant to Dallas
County. Nothing further happened for a substantial period of time. Sub-
sequently, the trial court issued a notice advising that the case would be
dismissed for want of prosecution on a specified date. In response, the
appellant's counsel contacted the court administrator to request a trial
setting and was told that the case would be taken off the dismissal docket
and set for jury trial. But, four days later, the trial court signed an order
dismissing the case for want of prosecution, even though it had already
been set on the jury docket after counsel's telephone conversation with
the administrator. The appellant then filed its verified motion to rein-
state the case, contending that its failure to appear was not intentional
nor the result of conscious indifference but rather was the result of the
court administrator's assurance that the case had been removed from the
dismissal docket and was set for jury trial. Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action for want of prosecu-
tion under the trial court's inherent authority because nearly three years
had passed since the suit had been filed, and very little activity had oc-
curred in the case other than the filing of the three Rule 11 agreements
174. TEX. R. App. P. 19.1(a).
175. Oscar Renda, 195 S.W.3d at 776-77.
176. 200 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
177. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
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and the transfer of the case from Tarrant to Dallas County.1 78
IX. JURY PRACTICE
In Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
the propriety of questions from counsel during voir dire that preview rel-
evant evidence and inquire of prospective jurors whether that evidence
would be outcome determinative. 179 In this automobile accident case, a
four-year-old who was seated, unbelted, in the front seat of her aunt's
Hyundai died in a low-speed collision after the passenger-side air bag
deployed. The trial judge dismissed the original two jury panels after nu-
merous prospective jurors stated during voir dire that the absence of a
seat belt on the child would determine their verdict. By the time the trial
court empaneled the third jury panel, it instructed the attorneys that only
general questions about seat belting and the jurors' personal habits about
wearing seatbelts could be asked. The trial court stated it would not al-
low the attorneys to specifically disclose that the child was not belted at
the time of the accident. Following a three-week trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Hyundai, from which the plaintiffs appealed.
The supreme court began by noting that trial courts should generally
allow broad latitude to counsel in voir dire to discover bias or prejudice
and to allow them to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. The
supreme court explained, however, that questions about the juror's opin-
ions regarding the facts of the case do not go to the issue of a disqualify-
ing bias or prejudice and are improper. Similarly, excluding jurors who
reveal whether they would give specific evidence great or little weight is
aimed at guessing the likely verdict of the jurors, not seating a fair jury.
Thus, the supreme court held that if the voir dire includes a preview of
the evidence, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to al-
low questions that seek to determine the weight that prospective jurors
will give (or not give) to a particular fact or set of relevant facts. 180 More-
over, if the trial judge permits questions about the weight jurors would
give relevant case facts, then the jurors' responses to such questions are
not per se disqualifying because "while such responses reveal a fact-spe-
cific opinion, one cannot conclude they reveal an improper subject-mat-
ter bias." 181
The Texas Supreme Court in In re General Electric Capital Corp.182
held that a party who did not receive notice of a jury demand did not
waive its contractual right to strike the jury demand by failing to object to
the case's placement on the jury docket at the time the demand was
made. 183 In this contract dispute, the agreement between the parties con-
178. Starkey, 200 S.W.3d at 752-53.
179. 189 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. 2006).
180. Id. at 753.
181. Id. at 743.
182. 203 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2006).
183. Id. at 316.
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tained a jury-waiver provision. The plaintiff subsequently filed a jury de-
mand and paid the jury fee, but the defendant claimed it did not receive
notice of that filing. Subsequently, the defendant learned of the jury de-
mand and sought to strike it, which the trial court denied. Finding that
the jury-waiver provision was valid and enforceable and had not been
waived, the supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to enforce that contractual provision.1
84
In Perez v. Kleinert,185 the Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals
held that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow an insurer's
attorney to participate at trial under false pretenses. Specifically, Michael
Perez was a passenger in Maria Garza's automobile when it was involved
in an automobile accident. State Farm was Garza's insurer. Perez subse-
quently joined State Farm to the suit, seeking underinsured or uninsured
motorists benefits. After the relationship between State Farm and Garza
became antagonistic, State Farm sued Garza in a separate declaratory
judgment action and obtained a judgment that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify Garza for the accident in question. Nonetheless, at the trial of
the underlying accident case, State Farm's attorney appeared and ad-
dressed the jury as if he were Garza's attorney, without revealing that he
was actually counsel for State Farm and not Garza. The court of appeals
held that such conduct represented a fatal conflict of interest and was
reversible error. 186
X. JURY CHARGE
In Shupe v. Lingafelter,187 the Texas Supreme Court reiterated that the
omission of an instruction is reversible error only if it caused the rendi-
tion of an improper judgment. Shupe arose out of a multi-car accident,
where the plaintiffs sued a truck driver, among other parties, for negli-
gence and his employer for negligent entrustment. Instead of requesting
a separate jury question on negligent entrustment, however, the plaintiffs
requested the following instruction:
As to [the employer], "negligence" means entrusting a vehicle to an
incompetent or reckless driver if the entrustor knew or should have
known that the driver was incompetent or reckless. Such negligence
is a proximate cause of a collision if the negligence of the driver to
whom the vehicle was entrusted is a proximate cause of the
collision. 188
The trial court refused to submit the requested instruction and, instead,
provided definitions of negligence, ordinary care, proximate cause, sole
proximate cause, and sudden emergency. After the jury found that the
truck driver and his employer were not negligent, the plaintiffs appealed
184. Id. at 316-17.
185. 211 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.).
186. Id. at 474.
187. 192 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. 2006).
188. Id. at 578-79.
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the trial court's refusal to submit its negligent-entrustment instruction.
The supreme court held that any error in refusing to submit the instruc-
tion was harmless because, under a negligent-entrustment theory, the
plaintiff must prove, among other elements, that the driver was negligent
and that his negligence proximately caused the accident.1 8 9 Here, be-
cause the jury had already found that the driver was not negligent, the
jury had provided its answer to the negligent-entrustment issue.190
In City of Houston v. Levingston, the First District Court of Appeals
held that the trial court had not committed error by refusing to submit, as
a separate question in the jury charge, a statutory affirmative defense that
was also an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. 19 1 In this case, a
veterinarian brought an action against his municipal employer, alleging
wrongful termination under the "whistle blower act."' 192 Under that stat-
ute, the defendant may raise, as an affirmative defense, that it "would
have taken the action against the employee that forms the basis of the
suit based solely on information, observation, or evidence that is not re-
lated to the fact that the employee made a report protected under this
chapter of a violation of law. ' 193 Here, the trial court did not include a
separate question concerning this affirmative defense but instead, submit-
ted the following liability question and instruction:
Were [the whistle blower's] reports to BARC, if any . . . made in
good faith and a cause of the City of Houston's terminating his em-
ployment when it did?
[The whistle blower's] reports were not a cause if the City of Hous-
ton would have terminated him based solely on information, obser-
vation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that he made the
reports.
The court of appeals held that this manner of submission was not an error
and, even if it were, any error was harmless because the affirmative de-
fense also negates the causation element of the plaintiff's cause of
action.194
XI. JUDGMENTS
In F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez,195 a case brought under
the Dram Shop Act, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of pro-
portionate responsibility under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. 196 Roberto Ruiz, who had spent the day cutting fire-
wood and consuming a case and a half of beer, drove his vehicle to a
convenience store and purchased an additional twelve-pack of beer. Ruiz
189. Id. at 580.
190. Id. at 580.
191. 221 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
192. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.002 (Vernon 2004).
193. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.004(b) (Vernon 2004).
194. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d at 218.
195. 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 102, 2006 WL 3110426 (Tex. Nov. 3, 2006).
196. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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opened a can of beer, apparently placed it between his legs, and then
entered the highway, where he caused a head-on car crash, injuring all
five members of the Duenez family. The plaintiffs sued Ruiz and others,
including F.F.P., the entity that owned the convenience store. F.F.P. filed
a cross-action against Ruiz, naming him as a responsible third party and a
contribution defendant. The plaintiffs then non-suited all of the defend-
ants except F.F.P. and proceeded to trial, but the trial court severed
F.F.P.'s cross-action against Ruiz and refused to submit questions to the
jury regarding Ruiz's negligence or proportionate responsibility. The jury
found against F.F.P., and the court of appeals affirmed that judgment.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion
by severing F.F.P.'s claims against Ruiz and proceeding to trial with
F.F.P. as the only defendant, and further, by refusing to submit F.F.P.'s
jury questions for determination of Ruiz's negligence and proportionate
responsibility.' 97 In so holding, the court noted that the Dram Shop Act
does not make a provider of alcohol vicariously liable for the conduct of
an intoxicated person. Rather, F.F.P.'s liability arose from the actions of
its employees and agents in serving an intoxicated person. Thus, F.F.P.'s
claim against Ruiz was not one for indemnification that could be severed,
but was instead one for contribution, and Ruiz's percentage of responsi-
bility should have been determined by the jury. 198
In Pilgrim's Pride Corp. v. Cernat, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
addressed the application of the Texas proportionate-responsibility stat-
utet 99 in the context of an automobile accident, where the jury found
each of the two plaintiffs to be twenty-five percent responsible for the
accident and the defendant to be fifty-percent responsible.2 0 0 The court
of appeals held that, although the most each plaintiff would be entitled to
receive would be seventy-five percent of the total amount awarded to
them, the defendant's liability exposure was capped at fifty percent of the
entire award.20 1 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
but reduced the amount of the award assessed against the defendant to
half of the total amount awarded by the jury. 20 2
The Amarillo Court of Appeals in B.T Healthcare, Inc. v. Honeycutt
held that the trial court erred by failing to apply the applicable settlement
credits after the plaintiff settled with one defendant. 20 3 Specifically, the
settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the settling defendant did
not expressly segregate the amounts to be excluded or included in the
calculation of the settlement credit. The court of appeals held that the
better practice is to expressly specify the division of settlement proceeds
as contemplated by the Texas Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. El-
197. Duenez, 50 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 111.
198. Id.
199. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.012-.013 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
200. 205 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
201. Pilgrim's Pride, 205 S.W.3d at 118-19.
202. Id. at 122.
203. 196 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.).
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lender.20 4 The court noted that no magic words are required to effectuate
that division if the face of the agreement makes clear the parties' intent.
Here, however, the language of the settlement agreement was not suffi-
cient to show how the dollars received from a settling defendant should
be allocated; therefore, the defendant was entitled to a dollar-for-dollar
settlement credit. 20 5
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Emeritus Corp. v. Ofczarzak
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a post-
judgment injunction that enjoined the appellant from dissipating or trans-
ferring its assets during the pendency of its appeal. 20 6 In this wrongful
death suit, the jury entered a judgment for the plaintiff of approximately
$1.5 million in compensatory damages and $18 million in punitive dam-
ages. After the defendant first moved to suspend enforcement of the
judgment without bond and submitted multiple affidavits showing its neg-
ative net worth, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an injunction pursuant to
Rule 24.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.20 7 Thereafter,
although the defendant posted a cash deposit of $1.7 million and moved
to quash all post-judgment discovery served on it, the appellate court
held that Rule 24.2(d)( 2) specifically authorized the trial court to enjoin
the judgment defendant from dissipating or transferring assets to avoid
satisfaction of the judgment pending appeal, even in the face of a cash
deposit covering the actual or compensatory damages.208
In Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Jackson,20 9 the First District Court
of Appeals held that the initial rendition of a judgment that was void as a
matter of law did not deprive the trial court of its plenary power to subse-
quently dispose of the case by rendering a valid final judgment. In this
workers' compensation case, the trial court originally entered a judgment
that failed to comply with section 410.258(f) of the Texas Labor Code,
which provides that "a judgment entered for a settlement approved with-
out complying with the requirements of this section is void.1210 Accord-
ingly, the rendition of this void judgment did not terminate the trial
court's jurisdiction over the action, and the trial court still had plenary
power when it signed a subsequent, valid judgment.211
Two courts of appeals addressed the issue of taxable costs during the
Survey period. In Custom Corporates, Inc. v. Security Storage, Inc., the
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals conditionally granted a writ of
mandamus where the trial court assessed certain expenses and attorneys'
204. 968 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the settling party must tender to the trial
court a settlement agreement allocating between actual and punitive damages as a condi-
tion precedent to limiting dollar-for-dollar settlement credits to settlement amounts repre-
senting actual damages).
205. Honeycutt, 196 S.W.3d at 299.
206. 198 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
207. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(d).
208. Emeritus Corp., 198 S.W.3d at 226-28.
209. 212 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
210. TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 410.258(f) (Vernon 2006).
211. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d at 803-04.
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fees of a non-party as "costs" against the parties to the lawsuit, after the
judgment had been rendered and the trial court's plenary power had
lapsed.21 2 Specifically, over three years after judgment was entered, a
non-party filed a motion to assess costs of approximately twenty thou-
sand dollars against the parties to the suit, which the trial court allowed.
In granting the writ, the court of appeals rejected the arguments that the
trial court's actions constituted a proper use of either its post-judgment
discovery powers under Rule 621(a) 213 or its statutory and inherent
power to enforce its judgment under Rule 308,214 as the trial court had no
authority to assess costs of a non-party against entities who were parties
to the original proceeding. 215
In Sterling Bank v. Willard M, L.L.C.,216 the First District Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's assessment of unpaid payroll, federal
payroll taxes, state tax liability, and other unpaid obligations as "taxable
costs" against the prevailing party on a suit on a note. In reaching this
conclusion, the court of appeals held that those items did not constitute
the statutorily permissible costs, which a successful party is entitled to
recover under Rule 131.217
XII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Rule 306a allows for the extension of post-judgment deadlines when a
party first receives notice of a judgment more than twenty, but less than
ninety days, after the judgment is signed.218 In In re The Lynd Co.,219 the
Texas Supreme Court held that, where the trial court does not make a
specific written finding confirming the date a party received actual notice
of the judgment, the deadlines may nonetheless be extended under Rule
306a if the date may be implied from the trial court's judgment, unless
there is no evidence supporting the implied finding or the party challeng-
ing the judgment establishes as a matter of law an alternative notice
date.220 To the extent that lower courts have held otherwise, the supreme
court disapproved of those decisions. 221 The supreme court went on to
recommend that trial courts remove such ambiguities about the date a
party received notice by following the procedures mandated by Rule
4.2(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure222 and issuing a specific
finding of the notice date as a matter of course.223 The court also sug-
gested that practitioners consider requesting such a finding from the trial
212. 207 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. dism'd).
213. TEX. R. Civ. P. 621(a).
214. TEX. R. Civ. P. 308.
215. Custom Corporates, 207 S.W.3d at 840.
216. 221 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131; Willard, 221 S.W.3d at 124-25.
218. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
219. 195 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2006).
220. Id. at 686.
221. Id.
222. TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(c).
223. Lynd, 195 S.W.3d at 686.
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court, as it would help circumvent unnecessary appeals where the actual
date of notice is determined by implication rather than by judicial
declaration. 224
The Texas Supreme Court in Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v.
Drewery Construction Co. held that, in the context of a motion for new
trial to set aside a default judgment where the defaulted party had actu-
ally been served but failed to answer, affidavits submitted to prove the
three-part Craddock 2 5 test are sufficient to prove or disprove that a
party's failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious
indifference if the affidavits are sufficiently detailed and not con-
clusory.22 6 Thus, if the defaulted party claims the process served on him
was "lost," such affidavits need not specify who actually lost the papers or
how because "[p]eople often do not know where or how they lost some-
thing-that is precisely why it remains 'lost.' 2 27 In this case, the mo-
vant's affidavits showed its efforts to establish a system that would avoid
legal papers being lost and the normal process that would have been fol-
lowed to avoid the same occurring. The supreme court held that these
statements were not conclusory and presented enough detail of that
party's normal processes to warrant granting the motion for new trial.228
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
In Tesco American, Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court addressed whether an appellate judge was "vicariously" disquali-
fied under the Texas Constitution based on her previous association with
a law firm that represented one of the parties to the case. 229 The supreme
court noted that Rule 18b(1)( a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically requires disqualification of trial judges in such circum-
stances, 230 but Rule 16.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure states
only "that disqualification is 'determined by the Constitution and laws of
Texas.'"231 The supreme court held that the Constitution does in fact
require vicarious disqualification of appellate judges. 232 The supreme
court explained that Rule 18b(1)( a) was not intended to expand the
grounds for disqualification beyond what the Constitution required, and
its prior interpretation of that rule recognized that the underlying basis
for vicarious disqualification emanated from the Constitution itself.233
224. Id.
225. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(1939) (requiring a new trial if the defendant shows (1) default was neither intentional nor
conscious indifference, (2) meritorious defense, and (3) new trial would cause neither delay
nor undue prejudice).
226. 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006).
227. Drewery Constr., 186 S.W.3d at 575.
228. Id. at 576.
229. 221 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Mar. 17, 2006).
230. Id. at 449 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)( a)).
231. Tesco, 221 S.W.3d at 551-52 (quoting TEX. R. App. P. 16.1).
232. Tesco, 221 S.W.3d at 551-52.
233. Id. (citing In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. 2002)).
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Moreover, the supreme court noted that, in an attorney-disqualification
case, there is an irrebuttable presumption that one attorney's knowledge
is imputed to all attorneys in a firm.234 The court concluded that the
same considerations should apply in cases of judicial disqualification,
since proving misuse of confidential information would be just as difficult,
and the damage to the legal profession just as extensive, if the rule were
otherwise. 235
Tesco also presented another question of first impression: what hap-
pens when an appellate opinion issues before it is discovered that one of
the appellate justices is disqualified? 236 The supreme court noted that,
while a disqualified appellate justice obviously cannot cast the deciding
vote, 237 there is little consensus on what should occur if the disqualified
justice's vote was not necessary to the decision. 238 Because the disquali-
fied justice authored the court of appeals' unanimous opinion in Tesco,
the supreme court held that the judgment would have to be reversed and
the case remanded to the court of appeals, where the two remaining jus-
tices could consider the case without the disqualified justice's participa-
tion.239 The supreme court refused to decide whether the result would
have been the same if the disqualified judge had not authored the opinion
or whether the remaining justices, who were not constitutionally disquali-
fied, should nevertheless be recused. 240
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Parnham addressed the interplay between disqualification and the
inadvertent production of privileged documents. 241 The plaintiff in the
underlying suit obtained an order disqualifying defendants' counsel based
on the latter's having examined privileged documents. While the factual
background was disputed, the documents were apparently inadvertently
produced by plaintiff in discovery. The First District Court of Appeals
rejected plaintiff's argument that, because her attorneys identified, by
bates number, the documents they intended to produce for inspection,
the privileged documents were actually obtained by opposing counsel
outside the course of normal discovery. 242 The court noted that the inad-
vertent disclosure took place in the course of plaintiff's formal document
production, and plaintiff could not limit the concept of normal scope of




238. Id. at 553.
239. Id. at 553. Justice Hecht dissented from this portion of the majority's opinion,
noting that the remaining two panel members had already denied a motion for rehearing
without the disqualified justice's participation, and reasoning that the majority was there-
fore requiring the parties to engage in a futile exercise. Id. at 557 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 457.
241. 01-06-00236-CV, 2006 WL 2690306 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2006,
orig. proceeding) [mand. granted] (not designated for publication).
242. Id. at *5.
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discovery to just her intended scope of production.243 The court of ap-
peals further held that this situation is now addressed in the so-called
"snap-back" provision of Rule 193.3,244 which provides a procedure for
reclaiming inadvertently produced privileged documents.2 45 The court
concluded that, although this rule impliedly prevents the other party from
using information for which a privilege is successfully reclaimed, it does
not provide any authority for disqualifying an attorney who reviewed the
documents before they were snapped- back.246
Disqualification under the former-attorney rule was the subject of two
cases during the Survey period.247 In Cimarron Agricultural, Ltd. v. Gui-
tar Holding Co., the El Paso Court of Appeals held that, where a party
sought to disqualify an attorney who previously represented it in a sub-
stantially related matter, it was not required to also prove actual
prejudice. 248 However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's or-
der disqualifying the attorney from all future matters involving the two
parties, reasoning that the test for whether the future representations
would be both adverse and substantially related are fact-specific inquir-
ies. 249 Similarly, in In re Drake, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
it was error to disqualify an attorney from representing the landowner in
an ad valorem tax dispute simply because he had previously represented
the appraisal district for twenty-two years in similar lawsuits. 250 The ap-
praisal district admitted that the facts in those prior representations had
nothing to do with the case under consideration but argued that all such
cases are substantially related because they raise the same claims and de-
fenses. The court of appeals held that the fact that valuation issues exist
in all tax cases would not support the disqualification order.25'
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
During the Survey period, the Texas courts once again had the oppor-
tunity to review and analyze arbitration provisions. In In re Palacios, the
Texas Supreme Court reviewed whether an order granting a motion to
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act could be reviewed
by mandamus. 252 Although the supreme court had previously held that
such an order could be reviewed by mandamus,253 federal law had
changed since its last opinion on the subject. Specifically, the United
States Supreme Court had held that the Federal Arbitration Act allowed
243. Id.
244. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3.
245. Parnham, 2006 WL 2690306 at *7 (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d)).
246. Id. at *7-8.
247. TEX. Disc. R. PROF. CONDUc-r 1.09.
248. 209 S.W.3d 197, 204-05 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
249. Id. at 202-03.
250. 195 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
251. Id. at 237.
252. 221 S.W.3d 564, 564 (Tex. 2006).
253. See Freis v. Canales, 877 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. 1994).
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mandamus review of orders granting arbitration if the underlying case
had been dismissed but did not allow review if the case was merely stayed
pending arbitration.254 Subsequently, however, the Fifth Circuit held that
a party could seek federal mandamus review of an order staying a case
for arbitration if the movant met the "particularly heavy" burden of
"clearly and indisputably" demonstrating that the district court did not
have discretion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. 255 Noting
that it was important for federal and state law to be as consistent as possi-
ble in this area, especially since both federal and state courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction to enforce the Federal Arbitration Act, the supreme
court followed the standards articulated by the federal courts in finding
the relator was not entitled to mandamus relief.256
In In re Vesta Insurance Group, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court re-
viewed whether a party had waived an arbitration provision "by litigating
for more than two years, engaging in written discovery, and taking a total
of four depositions. '257 After noting that there was a strong presumption
against waiver under the Federal Arbitration Act, the supreme court
found that the arbitration provision had not been waived. 258
In In re Heritage Building Systems, Inc. ,259 the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals held, as a matter of first impression, that a trial court lacks discre-
tion under the Federal Arbitration Act to order mediation before ruling
on a motion to compel arbitration. Rather, the court held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act contemplates not just a stay of trial, but a stay of all
trial proceedings, except for threshold issues, such as whether the parties
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. 260
In In re BP Products North America, Inc. ,261 the First District Court of
Appeals considered whether a Galveston trial court had properly issued
an order allowing the broadcasting and photographing of a trial under
Rule 18c, which provides:
A trial court may permit broadcasting, televising, recording, or
photographing of proceeds in the courtroom only in the following
circumstances:
(a) in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the Supreme
Court for civil cases, or
(b) when broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing
will not unduly distract participants or impair the dignity of the
proceedings and the parties have consented, and consent to being
depicted or recorded is obtained from each witness whose testi-
mony will be broadcast, televised, or photographed, or
254. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 87 n.2 (2000).
255. Apache Bohai Corp. v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2003).
256. Palacios, 221 S.W.3d at 565-66.
257. 192 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. 2006).
258. Id. at 763.
259. 185 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. granted]).
260. Id. at 542.
261. No. 01-06-00980-CV, 2006 WL 3230760 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 9,
2006, pet. granted) (not designated for publication).
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(c) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of in-
vestiture, or ceremonial proceedings. 262
In this case, some of the parties had not consented to broadcasting,
and, accordingly, the court of appeals had to determine whether the trial
court's decision was in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the
Texas Supreme Court. Because the supreme court had not yet adopted
or published rules for photographing and broadcasting court proceedings
in Galveston County courts, the trial court applied the Harris County
rules, which had been approved by the supreme court. The court of ap-
peals reversed, however, holding that the Harris County local rules do
not apply in Galveston County courts and therefore could not serve as
guidelines for the photographing and broadcasting of the trial
proceedings. 263
262. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18c.
263. BP Products, 2006 WL 3230760 at *2.
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